The U.S. Tilt Towards

Discussing the martial law situa-

tion in East Pakistan during

March of 1971, President Richard

Nixon, in his February 9, 1972

State of the World report to

Congress indicated that the

'United States did not support or

condone this military action.

Nevertheless, the U.S. did nothing

to help curtail the genocide and

never made any public statements

in opposition to the West Pakistani

and Kissinger called quiet diplo-

macy, the Administration gave a

green light of sorts to the

Pakistanis. In one instance, Nixon

declared to a Pakistani delegation

that, 'Yahya is a good friend.'

Rather than express concern over

the ongoing brutal military repres-

sion, Nixon explained that he

'understands the anguish of the

decisions which Yahya had to

make.' As a result of Yahva's

importance to the China initiative

and his friendship with Nixon and

Kissinger, Nixon declared that the

U.S. 'would not do anything to com-

plicate the situation for President

Yahya or to embarrass him.' Much

like the present situation post 9/11

Washington was hesitant to criti-

cize Pakistan publicly out of fear

that such a tactic might weaken

tinent began to grow, so did criti-

cism of American policy leanings

towards Pakistan. The administra-

tion denied that any specific anti-

India policy was being followed.

Declassified documents show that

in addition to tilting towards

Pakistan in its public statements,

the U.S. also followed a pro-

Pakistan line in the UN, in discus-

sions with China, and on the bat-

publicly pronounce India as the

aggressor in the war, the U.S. also

sent the nuclear aircraft carrier

U.S.S. Enterprise, to the Bay of

Bengal, and authorized the trans-

fer of U.S. military supplies to

Pakistan, despite the apparent ille-

gality of doing so. American

Military assistance was formally

cutoff to both India and Pakistan.

A combination of Nixon's emo-

tional attachment to General

Yahya and his dislike for Indira

Gandhi and West Pakistan's inte-

gral involvement with the China

initiative and Kissinger's predilec

tion for power politics greatly

influenced American policy deci-

The fact that the conflict occurred

over 50 years ago makes it possible

now to look at United States

actions and policy through docu-

ments released at the National

Archives under the U.S. govern-

sion-making during this conflict.

New Documentation

Not only did the United States

American interests.

tlefield as well.

dictator's support for

As the conflict in the Sub-con-

Instead, by using what Nixon

Russian Submarine.

tions in the East, which Ambassador Blood described as

'selective genocide,' Nixon states

that, "We will not measure our

in terms of what it has done in

relationship with the government

East Pakistan. By that criterion,

we would cut off relations with

every Communist government in

the world because of the slaughter

that has taken place in the

President Nixon, notes that the

refugee flow has not slowed, and

has reached approximately seven

to work towards a political solu-

tion in East Pakistan as well as

American arms transfers to

to Nixon, describes his talks with

the Chinese Ambassador in Paris.

Kissinger explains to the Chinese

that the U.S. is prevented from giv-

ing any military assistance to

Pakistan because of Congress, but

supports Chinese assistance by

stating that the U.S. would 'under-

stand it if other friends of

Pakistan will give them the equip-

ment they need.' He also declares

that the U.S. 'will do nothing to

embarrass the government of

Pakistan by any public state-

Kissinger discusses the devel-

opments in South Asia including

pendence in the East, the serious

insurgency movement underway

in East Pakistan, and the contin-

ued flow of refugees into India. He

suggests that American strategy

gives Yahya a face-saving way of

taking the political steps neces-

sary to re-establish normal condi-

tions. While Kissinger wrote in his

interest to prevent self-determina

tion for East Pakistan," the docu-

ments show that he believed other-

wise. In this record, at a time when

rapprochement with China was in

the national interest. Kissinger

suggests that 'a U.S. effort to split

off part of Pakistan in the name of

self-determination would have

implications for Taiwan and Tibet

repression of intellectuals in the

East continues, but on a reduced

scale. Ambassador Farland advis-

es that the best policy is to contin-

ue the current practice of 'persist-

ent but quiet pressure on GOF

The documents indicate that

in Peking's eyes.

Yahva's stand to not grant inde

Kissinger, in a memorandum

million. She questions U.S. efforts

Indira Gandhi, in a letter to

Communist countries.

of Mig-19's and F-104's will not hold

off the Indians. Handwriting next

to Mig-19s notes 'China' and next

Keating describes his difficulty

in explaining the rationale behind

the deployment of a carrier task

force. He also suggests that the

decision to send the task force into

aged Yahya to continue the

cease-fire upon the unconditional

surrender of West Pakistani forces

in East Pakistan. Despite the

cease-fire, American officials in

Dacca report that 'no one seems to

be in effective control of the situa-

tion,' and that fighting continues

between Bengalis and scattered

Mujahid/Razakar/West Pakistani

elements.' Also, in a heavily

excised paragraph, the CIA

reports that a squadron of

was delivered to Pakistan on 13

American origin, Jordanian F-104s

December, despite an American

embargo on military supplies to

both India and Pakistan. This

embargo includes third party

transfers of American equipment

to either of the parties. These are

during the East Pakistan crisis

convened meetings of the

Washington Special Action Group

WSAG) to discuss the situation in

South Asia. Records of these meet-

ings were kept, and somehow

leaked to Syndicated columnist

Jack Anderson, Anderson's arti-

cles, based on classified WSAG

minutes, became contentious, not

only because they quoted from

leaked classified material, but also

for their racy content. Kissinger

and others in the administration

oecame upset at Anderson's expo-

sure of White House policies

because, among other things, it

revealed the tilt towards Pakistan,

The Nixon administration,

some telling notes.

India has ordered a unilateral

the Indian Ocean has only encour-

o F-104s notes 'Jordan.'

Pakistani military effort.

राष्ट्रदुत



Khan postponed the opening indef-

regard for their political rights,

the ethnically Bengali East

Pakistanis took to the streets,

demanding that Yahya and West

Pakistan respect the election

Pakistani forces, commanded by

General Yahya and the Martial

Law Administrator, Lt. General

Tikka Khan, began a self-destruc-

tive course of repressive actions

against their fellow Pakistanis in

the East. The Martial Law

Administrators did not discrimi-

nate, targeting anyone from

Awami Leaguers to students.

Large numbers of Bengalis,

Muslims and Hindus, business-

men and academics, were killed

during this period of martial law.

The final tally of the dead, as

reported by Mujib, was approxi-

mately three million. As a result of

the violence and instability caused

in East Pakistan by the genocide.

an estimated ten million Bengalis

had fled across the border to India

by May 1971. The refugees were

problematic for two main reasons:

first, they created a strain on the

Indian economy, an economy just

coming to terms with develop-

ment. Secondly, a group of

refugees known as the Mukti

Bahini, referred to by the Indians

as 'Bengali Freedom Fighters,'

were using India as a base from

which to launch guerrilla attacks.

in efforts to fight against West

for India to handle. Eventually, ten-

sions between India and Pakistan

grew uncontrollable, and among

other things, the lack of a political

solution in East Pakistan and

Indian support for the guerrilla

fighters led to war between the two

neighbours. The end result of the

conflict was the splitting of

Pakistan into two separate states:

Pakistan in its present form and

an independent Bangladesh.

The refugees became too much

Pakistani oppression

On March 25, 1971, West

initely. Outraged by the West's dis

The U.S. Navy 7th Fleet



his is a record from the horses' mouth of what transpired into the defeat of Pakistan in 1971, and the subsequent humiliation of the American intent. Here are excerpts from the American National Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 79.

The National Security Archive published on the World Wide Web 46, declassified U.S. government documents and audio clips concerned with United States policy towards India and Pakistan during the South Asian Crisis of 1971. The documents, declassified

and available at the U.S. National Archives and the Presidential Library system, detail how United States policy, directed by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, followed a course that became infanously known as 'The Tilt.'

Pakistan's December 1970 elec tions, the first free democratic elections for the National Assembly in Pakistan's history. saw Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib) Rahman's East Pakistan-based Awami League party (AL) win 167 out of 169 seats contested in Pakistan's Eastern flank, giving the AL a majority and control of the 313-seat National Assembly. This was the first time that politi cal power in Pakistan would be


concentrated in its Eastern half. West Pakistan's loss of politi cal power over East Pakistan was devastating. Threatened by this development, on March 1, 1971, with the Assembly set to open in two days, the military dictator General Agha Muhammad Yahva




Pakistani officers laying down their weapons as a mark of surrender to the Indian Army in East Pakistan.

'The Tilt' The U.S. And The Shameface

By using what Nixon and Kissinger called quiet diplomacy, the Administration gave a green light of sorts to the Pakistanis. In one instance, Nixon declared to a Pakistani delegation that, 'Yahya is a good friend.' Rather than express concern over the ongoing brutal military repression, Nixon explained that he 'understands the anguish of the decisions which Yahya had to make.' As a result of Yahya's importance to the China initiative and his friendship with Nixon and Kissinger, Nixon declared that the U.S. 'would not do anything to complicate the situation for President Yahya or to embarrass him.' Much like the present situation post 9/11, Washington was hesitant to criticize Pakistan publicly out of fear that such a tactic might



#1971



Nixon's Handwritten Message, "To all hands, Don't Squeeze Yahya at this time"

ment's historical declassification program. The record is far from complete: numerous materials remain classified both by the State Department, CIA and other agencies as well as the Nixon Presidential Materials Project. Nevertheless, the available documents offer many useful insights into how and why Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made impor-

tant decisions during the 1971 South Asian Crisis. The NSC Senior Review Group discusses the situation in East Pakistan and increasing tensions between India and Pakistan. The President indicates that 'the big story is Pakistan,' and he expresses his concern from the standpoint of human suffering. While Nixon suggests that some Indian and

Pakistani interest might be served by war, it is not in American interests as 'the new China relationship would be imperiled, probably beyond repair.' While stating that the Indians are more 'devious' than the 'sometimes extremely stupid' Pakistanis, the U.S. 'must not-cannot-allow' India to use the

refugees as a pretext for breaking

up Pakistan. Despite the condi-

issinger, in a memorandum to Nixon, describes his talks with the Chinese Ambassador in Paris. Kissinger explains to the Chinese that the U.S. is prevented from giving any military assistance to Pakistan because of Congress, but supports Chinese assistance by stating that the U.S. would 'understand it if other friends of Pakistan will give them the equipment they need.' He also declares that the U.S. 'will do nothing to embarrass the government of Pakistan by any public statements.' Kissinger discusses the developments in South Asia including Yahya's stand to not grant independence in the East...

towards better treatment of East Pakistanis in all categories. The U.S., disguising the movement of the nuclear aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal for evacuation purposes, gladly lets the ship movement represent possible American involvement in the conflict, especially if it expanded to a superpower confrontation. Admiral Welander from the NSC Staff indicates that the JS has approved, for

planning purposes only, the CINC-

PAC concept to ready a USS attack carrier to dissuade 'third party' involvement in the South Asia cri-

Keating suggests that Gandhi

is trying to 'cool' the political cli-

mate in India while continuing to

exert pressure on Pakistan. The President's Briefing indicates, however, that India is stepping up its support for the guerillas fighting in East Pakistan, action that could 'goat' the Pakistanis into a full-scale war. In one of the messages. UN Ambassador Bush describes the December 10 meeting between Kissinger and the Chinese delegation to the United Nations. While discussing the India-Pakistan crisis, Kissinger reveals that the American position on the issue was parallel to that of the Chinese. Kissinger disclosed that the U.S. would be moving some ships into the area, and also that military aid was being sent from Jordan, Turkey, and Iran, Some of this aid was illegally transferred because it was American in origin. Bush also reports that Kissinger gives his tacit approval for China to provide militarily support for Pakistani operations against India. Bush expresses his personal doubts in the administration's 'Two State Departments thing,'

style, in one instance calling him paranoid and arrogant. The DIA assesses the limits and possibility of Chinese support to the Pakistanis. It opines that while Chinese support will be limited to political, diplomatic, and propaganda for the time being, the PRC could initiate small attacks in the high mountainous areas in the East, and therefore occupy Indian troops without 'provoking Soviet

and takes issue with Kissinger's

Heavy fighting is turning in favour of the Indians, while ceasefire plans continue to be in the works. A controversy is brewing with regards over the U.S. decision to send a nuclear carrier into the Bay of Bengal. The present trickle

despite the genocidal conditions in the East. rajeshsharma1049@gmail.com




#NO MORE

Ab Tumhare Hawale...

He oversaw the planning, execution, and operation of all nuclear power projects across the nation.

r. M R Srinivasan, the for-mer Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, passed away on Tuesday, 20 May 2025, at the age of 95. The veteran scientist suddenly fell ill overnight in Ooty and peacefully passed away in the local hospital at 4 a.m. on Tuesday. M R Srinivasan was the former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who played a major role in developing India's nuclear power programme.

Malur Ramasamy (M R) Srinivasan, born in January 1930. was an Indian nuclear scientist and mechanical engineer who was also responsible for the development of a Pressurised Heavy-Water Reactor (PHWR) in India. After joining the Department of Atomic Energy (DÅE) in September Srinivasan worked with Dr. Homi Bhabha on the nation's first nuclear research reactor, Apsara, which achieved criticality in August 1956. In 1959, he was appointed as the



construction of India's first atomic power station, and later in 1967, he took charge of the Madras Atomic Power Station as its Chief Project

In 1974, he became the Director of the Power Projects Engineering Division, DAE, and later, in 1984, he was promoted to the Chairman of the Nuclear Power Board, where he oversaw the planning, execution, and operation of all nuclear power projects across the nation. In 1987. he finally became the Chairman of

PM Modi's Condolences In a social media post, Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed condolences on the demise of veteran scientist M R Srinivasan. Modi highlighted how Srinivasan's role in developing India's nuclear infrastructure has been foundational for the industry.

the Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary of the Department of Atomic Energy, He was awarded the Padma Vibhushan, India's highest civilian recognition for all his conributions to the Indian nuclear programme. M R Srinivasan completed his schooling in Mysore and later oined the engineering college (cur rently UVCE) by M. Visvesvaraya, where he finished his Bachelor's in Mechanical Engineering in 1950. He also did his Master's in gas

turbine technology from McGill University in Canada in 1954.

up scared of science instead of

being excited about it. Some

others think of it as a subject

that requires a lot of memo

rization. That kind of think-

ing should not be there.

Children should be taught to

appreciate science as a tool to

answer many questions and

feel more competent by learning to use it. In order to be able

to achieve this, the way in

which science is taught in

schools has to change first.

of astrophysics for many

decades now. In which

JN: One has to see the historical

direction do you see the

research in this area pro-

growth in this field. It all start-

ed with astronomy, observing

the sky and stars. Later

human curiosity is such that

people wanted to know why

things happen. This led to

advances in the field of astro-

physics. Then, there was a

time when a new aspect of

astronomy, called astrochem-

istry, caught the attention of

many researchers. Scientists

previously believed that there

occurred no chemistry in

interstellar space, as there was

hardly any matter in there.

and therefore, found it largely

uninteresting. But they turned

out to be wrong, as it was

found that space has many

complex organic molecules

So, astrochemistry is now a

fast-developing field of sci-

ence. And as you might have

guessed, the next direction the

research is expected to take off

in is astrobiology. For a very

long time, people have been

interested in finding out if

life, as we know, exists elsewhere in the universe. This is

where the research will be headed next. Currently, there

are more students taking up advanced studies in astrono

my and astrophysics. But fields like astrochemistry and

astrobiology remain unex-

plored. It will take time for

research in these subjects to

pick up and progress, especial

contribute towards science

ious ways towards public edu

cation. On various aspects of

science. For example, I had many school children come

and ask me for autographs

In what ways can scientis

education in India?

JN: Scientists can take part in var-

y astrobiology.

Now A Star In The Sky

"Space has many complex organic molecules, so astrochemistry is now a fast-developing science." - Narlikar

Physicist V.V. Narlikar is no more. We, at Arbit, have the good fortune at this time of loss to pass on to our readers some of the observations from this mostly silent man, please read on, but first, something about the man-Narlikar was born in Kolhapur, India, on 19 July 1938, into an academic family. His father, Vishnu Vasudev Narlikar, was a mathematician and theoretical physicist who was a professor and head of department at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi. His mother, Sumati Narlikar, was a scholar of Sanskrit. Narlikar went to school at Central Hindu College (now Central Hindu Boys School) in Varanasi. He then studied at Banaras Hindu University. He continued his education at Cambridge University, where he was a member of Fitzwilliam

ndia's renowned Astro

College (as his father had been). Narlikar began his research career as a doctoral student in theoretical cosmology, under the guidance of Fred Hovle in Cambridge. He was then a postdoctoral fellow at King's College in Cambridge and earned an additional master's physics. In 1966, Fred Hoyle established the Institute of Theoretical Astronomy in Cambridge, Narlikar was a founding member of the institute, while remaining a fellow at King's College

In 1972, Narlikar returned to India as a professor at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in Mumbai, where he led its theoretical astrophysics group. In 1981, Narlikar became a founding member of the World Cultural Council. In 1988, he was appointed the founding director of the Inter-University Centre for Astronomy and Astrophysics (IUCAA) in Pune.

By Jerry Scott & Jim Borgman



Astronomical Union commission for cosmology. The National Council Educational Research and Training appointed Narlikar as responsible for developing textbooks in science and mathematics.

Narlikar's research involved Mach's principle, quantum cosmology, and action-at-a-distance Dissatisfied with the standard Big Bang model of cosmology, Narlikar investigated alternative models, a field known as non-standard cosmology. With Fred Hoyle, he developed a conformal gravity theory known as Hoyle-Narlikar theory, which attempted to synthesise general relativity with Mach's principle. It proposes that the inertial mass of a particle is a function of the masses of all other particles, multiplied by a coupling constant. which is a function of cosmic time. The theory was not accepted by mainstream cosmology. Narlikar married Mangala Narlikar (née Rajwade), searcher and professor. The couple had three daughters: Geeta, a piomedical researcher at the University of California, San Francisco, Girija and Leelavati who ooth work in computer science. Here is a rare interview for our readers- **BY IPSITA HERLEKAR**

culture of science in socie ty. How can one propagate the culture of science? JN: Today, planetariums are found

in many of the larger cities in India. This spread or growth of planetariums I have observed as I have grown older. The first planetarium, I remember, was first set-up in Kolkata and it was the only one for many many years. until one was built in Bombay Now, you have a chain of planetariums in many cities around the country, including one in Bengaluru


IH: What is your opinion on the current system of science education in India?

JN: Science should be a subject that children like. But that is not how it is most likely perceived. Many children grow

IH: You have always advocated the need to cultivate a

And instead of just signing on a small plain piece of paper, I used to ask them to write a sci ence question on a postcard and I would answer the question and sign it too. I felt that was one way of making children think about science.


THE WALL



BABY BLUES



YEAH AND THEY ONLY HAVE HALF-DAYS ALL NEXT WEEK AND JUST THREE DAYS OF SCHOOL THE WEEK AFTER THAT.



ZITS





