

#TRIED AND TASTED

Turkish Mocha Pots

Traditionally, Turkish puddings are milk or pastry-based and very sweet. There are ample amount of chocolate desserts




Most Indians are known for having a sweet tooth. When it comes to having 'something sweet,' we are all equally guilty. That is why there is an amazing variety of popular Indian sweets. Though Indian desserts are in high demand all over the world, we should always try something that hails from other place. Traditionally, Turkish puddings are milk or pastry-based and very sweet. There are ample amount of chocolate desserts. Try this special dish that combines chocolate with very Turkish flavours.

Ingredients

- 250ml whole milk
- 250ml double cream
- Ground Seeds from 5 cardamom pods
- ½ cinnamon stick
- 4 tablespoons soft, dark brown sugar
- 2 tablespoons corn flour
- 4 teaspoons instant espresso coffee
- 200gm plain chocolate, chopped
- 25gm unsalted butter
- 1 teaspoon vanilla extract

Method

- Put the milk and cream into a saucepan with cardamom and cinnamon. Bring to the boil, then pull the pan off the heat and leave it for 30 minutes so that the spices can flavour the liquid. Strain to remove the spices.
- Mix the sugar, corn flour and coffee together in a saucepan. Gradually, whisk in the milk and cream mixture, adding slowly so that no lumps form. Set over a medium heat; bring to the boil, stirring constantly, then, take off the heat. Add the chocolate, vanilla and whisk until the mixture is complete, smooth and the chocolate has melted. Divide between six little pots or coffee cups. Cover with cling film and refrigerate for at least 2 hours to firm up.
- Whisk the cream with icing sugar and use it to decorate each mocha pot. Then, sprinkle with chocolate-coated coffee beans.



Suez Canal.

● Kshema Jatuhkarna

Britain's general predisposition against the development of the Suez Canal was the result of longstanding fears held by government and military officials about maintaining the Empire's control over seaborne paths to India. This fear grew from past observation of trade with the subcontinent. In 1785, Colonel James Capper wrote in a report to the British East India Company:

"When the Venetians lost their India trade, no violence, no finesse was used to deprive them of it; the trade died away of itself, because the Portuguese and other European nations, passing round the Cape of Good Hope, could...afford to undersell them in those articles of India commerce which they received only by the more tedious, dangerous, and expensive channel of the Red Sea..."

Ironically, Capper used the gradual obsolescence of Venice's route through the Red Sea to describe the vulnerability of the route around the Cape of Good Hope that replaced it. The Colonel's description is particularly relevant because he states that the economic efficiency of the new route alone ended Venetian control of imported Indian goods. Observations like Capper's provided the basis for the

long-held British perspective that a less efficient route under British dominion was preferable to a more efficient route controlled by another power. Capper's historical imagination of the succession of power over the international commerce of India represents the tendency of contemporary strategists to draw misguided lessons from the past regarding trade with the subcontinent. This tendency echoed in Prime Minister Palmerston's arguments to maintain Britain's quasi-monopoly on the route to India around the Cape of Good Hope rather than supporting the Suez Canal. Some historians, such as Charles Hallberg and Katharine Bell, argue that the fundamentally conservative foreign policy outlooks of the governments under Palmerston, Russell and Derby sustained this perspective on the Suez Canal even in the face of its clear economic and strategic advantages for Britain.

Primary British Motives

Britain's general historical motivation to oppose construction of the canal compounded with specific strategic concerns and deep political prejudice to sustain an impolitic policy towards the canal through 1865. From the 1850s through the early 1860s, Lord Palmerston genuinely believed that the canal posed a serious threat to Britain's most vital interests. Understanding his concerns requires appreciation of

his frame of reference: rather than concerning himself with the projected immediate economic advantages of the canal, he analyzed the waterway with the primary goal of preserving 200 years of imperial gains from France. He saw that the Ottoman Empire as an impenetrable barrier between Europe and Britain's empire in Asia, and he believed that the waterway would serve as the lifeline for French colonization of Egypt's isthmus. He worried that at the very least, an incomplete canal would form a wide, deep, and defensible military trench, separating Egypt from the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. He estimated that such a defensive feature would link with the preexisting Nile barrage, and permit the defense of Egypt from Ottoman incursions. Palmerston aired his calculations in Parliament in 1857, stating:

"The scheme (behind the Suez Canal) is one hostile to the interests of this country, opposed to the standing policy of England in regard to the connection of Egypt with Turkey, a policy which has been supported by the Treaty of Paris. The obvious political tendency of the undertaking is to render more easy the separation of Egypt from Turkey... (the plan for the Suez Canal) is in every way so adverse to British interests... the object which M. de Lesseps and some of the promoters have in view will be accomplished, even if the whole of the undertaking should not be carried into execution..."

But this public statement did not convey Palmerston's imagined worst case scenario. The Prime Minister believed that the canal could become a 'second Bosphorus,' which would divert trade to channels through Austria while serving as a naval passage for French ironclad ships, which could at any time capture British controlled Aden and Mauritius, forever destroying the insularity of India. In communication with de Lesseps in 1865, Palmerston avoided creating friction with France by merely hinting at his wide range of strategic concerns:

"I do not hesitate to point out to you my apprehensions; they consist first, in the fear of seeing the commercial and maritime relations of Great Britain upset by the opening of a new route which, while giving passage to the navigation of all countries, will take away the advantages we possess at the present

Earl of Clarendon.

time. I will also acknowledge to you that I fear the uncertainty of the future concerning France, the future which every statesman must consider in all its unpleasant eventualities."

Palmerston's reasoning and his will to act on his concerns influenced the statesmen of his time. In concurrence with then Prime Minister Palmerston, Foreign Secretary Lord Clarendon, who had also served in the Earl of Aberdeen's preceding government, remarked in 1855 that France could seize the canal at both ends during a time of war, and for that reason "it would...be a suicidal act on the part of England to assent to the construction of the canal."

Lord Palmerston's fears resonated in the minds of statesmen both in and outside his cabinets through the early 1860s. In his 1861 dispatch to Sir Henry Bulwer, Britain's Ambassador in Constantinople, then Foreign Secretary Lord Russell restated the strategic concern that the canal could serve as a passage for French warships on their way to India. "It is not to be denied," he argued, "that in time of war, a canal 300 feet wide might...afford facilities to ships of war going from Toulon to Indian Seas." Upon visiting the canal construction in 1862, Bulwer corresponded with Russell to assert that viceregal cowardice, along with the irresponsibility of European capitalists, would allow the fruition of French colonial designs in Egypt,



National Whipped Cream Day: A Sweet Celebration

celebrated every year on January 5, National Whipped Cream Day is a delightful tribute to one of the most beloved dessert toppings. From sundae and hot chocolate to pies and cakes, whipped cream adds a light, creamy touch that elevates treats of all kinds. The day also encourages culinary creativity, inspiring home bakers and dessert lovers to experiment with flavoured, sweetened, or vegan versions. Beyond indulgence, it's a moment to appreciate the simple joys of life, a dollop of cream, a sprinkle of joy, and the happiness that comes with sharing sweet moments.

# Britain's Anti-Canal Policy

## Rather Be Poor Than France Getting Rich

PART:2


In addition to strategic concerns, deep political prejudice undergirded British opposition. Britain contested the construction of the waterway because it was promoted by a Frenchman and because it seemed to be a French undertaking. These facts made the canal appear menacing to Britain's relationship with India, the jewel of its Empire. Evidence of this chauvinistic objection lies in France's non-threatening policy towards the canal. Article XIV of the original concession proclaimed that the canal would forever be a 'neutral passage.' Furthermore, there was little evidence that France was plotting to use the canal to fulfill imperial designs in Egypt. The Suez Canal Company remained privately traded from November 1858, when de Lesseps floated the stock in Paris. Britain's strong aversion to the project, which ultimately served the Empire's interests, remained an example of its blinding bias against a hereditary enemy.



Ferdinand de Lesseps, French Engineer.



Colonel James-Capper and his daughter, 1782.




Northernmost part of Gulf of Suez with town Suez on the map of 1856.

#BUSINESS



Earl of Clarendon.



Robert Cecil.



Ismail Pasha.



Lord Palmerston.

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A New Policy towards the Canal

After spending over a decade obstructing the progress of the Suez Canal, Britain began to incorporate the passage into its imperial designs in 1865. The transition between opposition to and tacit support for the project resulted from the acknowledgment by British officers that de Lesseps would eventually complete the canal. After his second tour of canal construction sites in 1865, Bulwer wrote to Russell to recommend that British warships be stationed at Suez, that British warehouses and hospitals be built on the Isthmus and that Englishmen be encouraged to settle in Egypt. He framed these suggestions as means of offsetting French influence that would result from the canal, which he referred to as 'a plan less and less disguised.' This correspondence represents the shift in attitude, towards accepting the eventual completion of the canal, that led Britain finally to lend its support to the project in March of 1865. That same year, Lord Cowley, Britain's Ambassador to France, and Drouyn de Lhuy, then French Foreign Minister, decided on princ-

ples that would govern a new contract between de Lesseps and Ismail Pasha, then Viceroy of Egypt. The British Empire's new plans also emerged through official pronouncements. Immediately after the completion of the canal in 1869, the Earl of Clarendon, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to de Lesseps regarding the project:

"The successful opening of the Suez Canal has been received with great and universal satisfaction... (Her Majesty's Government congratulates you) on the establishment of a new means of communication between East and West, and on the political and commercial advantages, which we may confidently expect, will result from your efforts."

Queen Victoria followed suit by awarding de Lesseps the Grand Cross of the Order of the Star of India and by making him a Freeman of the City of London. These honors were bestowed at a magnificent fête held at the Crystal Palace.

Suez Canal, between Kantara and El-Fedane, 1869

Britain followed its preliminary diplomatic gestures with swift action to take advantage of the Suez Canal. The Empire quickly altered the path of its ships to Asia. By 1870, 289,234 tons of British goods passed through the

canal, making up 71 percent of the total tonnage transported through the waterway. From 1871 to 1876, Britain moved more tonnage through the canal than all other European powers combined. Transit to India around the Cape of Good Hope became no longer economically sound. Britain tapped the military potential of the canal in October 1871 when it began sending troops to India through the waterway, reducing the cost of maintaining what had become the world's most expensive army. A British telegraph line was also laid through the Red Sea in 1871 to improve communication between London and Bombay. Yet these aggressive steps to take full advantage of the canal represented only the beginning of London's new foreign policy regarding the waterway.

Britain gained influence over the Suez Canal Company by purchasing a large portion of its stock. In 1875, after years of maintaining the large external debts accumulated by Said Pasha, his successor Ismail Pasha sold Egypt's share in the canal, nearly 44 percent of the stock, to Britain. Benjamin Disraeli, who was again serving under Derby as Chancellor of the Exchequer, financed the bold purchase with a short-term loan from Lionel de Rothschild. The acquisition gave Britain considerable control over practices in the canal. Though France still controlled the majority of the shares, Britain's new influence, it had gained the maximum of 10 shareholder votes, enabled the Government to keep Russian naval vessels from passing through the canal while securing Britain's ever-increasing trade through the waterway.

With the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877, Britain further asserted its interest in the Suez Canal's security. On May 6, a note sent from Prime Minister Derby asked Russia to respect the Suez Canal as a primary British interest and affirmed that "an attempt to blockade or otherwise interfere with the Canal or its approaches would be regarded as a menace to India and a grave injury to the commerce of the world."

Russia responded with a conciliatory note renouncing any belligerent action against the canal. These developments represented Britain's strengthening will to protect the waterway.

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Usurpation via Invasion

The monumental shift in British foreign policy towards the Suez Canal culminated in 1882, when England invaded Egypt. Though Britain's intervention was primarily in response to violence against Europeans in Alexandria and the Delta area, the landing of British troops near the canal proved the strongest evidence that the Empire's interests in the conflict were deeply connected to the fate of the waterway. Further evidence lies in Admiral Hoskins' solicitation of permission from the Khedive to secure the canal during the invasion. His request was granted days after the landing took place in a note from the Khedive urging him "to occupy such points of the Isthmus of Suez...useful for the free traffic on the Canal." When Britain took Cairo in 1882 and turned Egypt into a de facto protectorate, the Empire had by extension usurped the Suez Canal, ensuring British control of the waterway for decades to come.

The irony of the conflict illuminates the degree to which Britain had incorporated control of the canal into its interests. The paradox of the invasion lay in its proponent: a liberal government voted into office to curb imperial expansion. Despite Prime Minister William Gladstone's election slogans, he sent British and Indian troops,

nearby 4,500 kilometers from their garrisons, to attack the newly organized Army of Egypt in its homeland. Such a hypocritical order was only tolerated as a result of the sentiments of the day. Hawks in Parliament analogized the canal to the right of way enjoyed by English property owners whose lands were reachable only through private lots. Access to India through the waterway had become Britain's inherent right, so these politicians argued.

Britain used the invasion to serve its immediate interests in the Suez Canal. After British troops secured the canal, officials in London stipulated that British commercial ships would enjoy precedence in traffic through the waterway for three days. In the following months, British laborers replaced the Arabs who had forcefully taken over the canal during the conflict, allowing the Suez Canal Company to begin employing workers and generating profits on its original terms. A gunboat was also sent to Port Said to protect the movement of British goods through the canal. These acts to immediately restore not only the naval but also the commercial purposes of the canal elucidate the link between Britain's invasion and the security of the waterway.


Conclusion.

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Suez opening.




THE WALL



BABY BLUES



ZITS



By Jerry Scott & Jim Borgman

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