

When They Fly Past...

e have fought wars and recorded our braves well, commemorated them and recorded for posterity. In many ways. And here is another, to remind ourselves of what our men are made of. These are paintings recreating the famous battles won, and some men lost, but not from our memories. Paintings are done by reading accounts from various sources, and corrections are made along for true narration.



Starfighter shot down over Jamnagar

19 71 war with Pakistan finally broke out on 03 Dec, 1971, with PAF carrying our pre-emptive strike against 12 IAF air bases. No. 47 Squadron, 'Black Archers' with six MiG-21FL ac were meanwhile deployed at Jamnagar for ORP duties. The detachment was headed by its CO. Wg Cdr HS Gill, Other pilots were Sqn Ldr Vinay Kapila, Vr C, Son Ldr Guni Saigal, Flt Lt SK (Neelu) Malik, Flt Lt BB Soni, Flt Lt IJS Boperoi etc. The recently added twin GSh-23mm cannon in gondola to MiG-21's main armament of 2 X K-13 heat seeking air-toair missiles proved big morale booster for the squadron pilots.

The squadron had mounted dawn to dusk ORP since arrival at Jamnagar. With PAF raids limited to only few night time unsuccessful raids over the airfield, ORP duties were becoming quite tedious for the MiG pilots. The long awaited ORP hooter, however, finally came to life on 12 December, with Sqn Ldr Guni Saigal and Flt Lt BB Soni on ORP duty CAP Controller was Flt Lt IJS Boperoi, assisted by two Pilot Officers from OCU

MOPs positioned along the Saurashtra coast had reported two bandits flying low, crossing the coast in the general direction of Jamnagar. Two MiGs on ORP quickly got airborne to set up CAP overhead at 3 kms (10,000 Ft). Shortly, CAP Controller reported sighting of two bandits at low level. with No 2 in a long trail, approaching the airfield from the direction of the town. Bandits were identified as two PAF F-104A Starfighters. The lead Starfighters appeared to have spotted a MiG-21 on ground next to ORP 24, which was actually a decoy. He opened fire flying along aircraft, and pulled up to see the the MiG-21, in every department

seen turning hard onto Northerly direction, trying to align himself for a strafing attack on another

With CAP Controller providing running commentary on positions of two bandits, both CAP aircraft, reported visual contact. They positioned over the raiders and were to descend for engagement after going past the ack-ack envelopment. However, it later appeared that in the excitement, both pilots had positioned behind the lead Starfighter, letting the No 2 Starfighter make a clean escape. He was seen by OP going flat out with afterburner on at low level in general direction of Karachi. It was finally Flt Lt BB Soni

who positioned behind the lead

Starfighter and closed in for a missile launch. The F-104 successfully used its IR flares to deflect the K-13 heat, seeking missiles fired at it, by BB Soni. Both aircraft were now skimming the sea level at extreme high speed with Soni in hot pursuit. With missile missing the target. Soni selected 'guns' for engagement at close range. As MiG started closing the gap between the hunter and the hunted, with speed clocking almost 1200 km/hr, the Pakistani fighter made a desperate attempt to shake his adversary by pulling up sharply to his right, perhaps, to throw off a second missile. The MiG-21 now rapidly closed distance, and from 300 meters, fired three sharp bursts with GSh-23mm cannons at the F-104, which started wobbling as if out of control. It pulled up momentarily and started to flame, and almost immediately. the Pakistani pilot ejected. Flt Lt Soni flew past the stricken enemy base of the ejection and kept in contact with the bright orange canopy of the ejected pilot's parachute, as it fell into the shark infest ed sea below, with the pilot still in harness. It is possible that the PAF pilot, during the process of ejection

Flt Lt Soni informed the base to dispatch a rescue launch to the exact spot, and then, returned to base. However, the Pakistani pilot, later identified as Wing Commander ME Middlecoat, a war hero of 1965 war, was never found.

Years later, military strate-

at very high speed, suffered serious

gists still wonder as to why PAF used the two F-104s with no air-toground weapon whatsoever, to attack a heavily defended airfield like Jamnagar. If it was not for the mix up of our CAP pilots, PAF would have certainly faced the ignominy of losing both the F-104s in the encounter. The disastrous outcome of the battle for the PAF also lays to bare the so called 'professionalism' of their pilots, which the foreign media. particularly the American press always tries to cite to helittle IAF pilots. Aviation experts through out the world followed the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War with great interest. The Starfighter was still the mainstay of the NATO air forces at that time, and for years, there had been a great deal of conjecture about how the American fighter would fare against modern Soviet equipment. F-104s and MiG-21s clashed a number of times in the 1971 war, and by end of the war, there could no longer be any doubt that the Starfighter was no match for the runway. No 2 Starfighter was parachute deploy. He informed the of aerial warfare.

#PEACOCKS OF VALOUR

THE BATTLE OF LONGEWALA

was one of the major decisive battles fought on the Western sector during the India-Pakistan War of 1971. On the night of 04/05 Dec, 1971, Pakistan forces comprising 4000 soldiers, T-59 and Sherman tanks, and a medium artillery battery crossed the Indian borto advance towards Jaisalmer What followed was a complete debacle for Pakistan Army as their Chinese-made T-59 tanks started to get bogged down in the sand and the rear supply supports were not able to catch up with the forward elements for a rapid advance, essential for an armoured thrust into the enemy territory.

At nightfall, the advancing col-

Indian border post at Longewala, manned by a handful of Indian troops of 23 Punjab. They had just one RCL gun that could be the only weapon to engage a tank. Till then, the advancing Pakistani force had achieved a complete element of surprise. Frantic calls to Indian Air Force at Jaisalmer to come to the assistance of the beleaguered Army troops at Longewala could not be realised as the Hunter fighters, based at Jaisalmer, were not designed to engage ground targets at night. The small Army unit, however, held on and that heroic resistance, led by Major KS Chandpuri, has been well-portrayed in the

DER.' At first light, the Hunters took to the air and what fol-Pakistani force. The Hunters enemy tanks caught in the open desert, and went about engaging them with rockets and guns that IAF pilots termed it as 'Partridge shooting.' By end of the day close to 30 tanks were seen fiercely burning along with an equal number of soft skinned vehicles. The pride of Pakistani armoured force lay in Pakistani top brass had agreed operation, to advance deep into



audacious Canberra crews, who flew almost 600 NMs into the enemy territory at night, trailing one another at near medium levels, Force (PAF) in 1965 war with

Unlike IAF in 1965, PAF with its US built F-104 Starfighters, equipped with Sidewinder AIM 9B missile, had night intercept capability and vintage Canberras practically were sitting ducks against this supersonic, state-of-the-art interceptor. PAF also was fortunate to receive from US an effective radar chain for early warning pur-

allowance of fuel for any tactical routing. Fuel constraint also meant

important for India as PAF had moved bulk of its attack force to its rear airfields, and almost the entire B-57 ac bomber force was shifted to Peshawar immediately after IAF carried out retaliatory strikes on most of PAF bases, with its Hunters and Mysteres on 07 Sep, 1965. PAF considered Peshawar to be outside the range of Indian strike aircraft, and hence, a safe haven for its strategic force of US made B-57 long range bombers. Yet, as night

Pakistani territory.

parked aircraft. Had luck favoured

France in mid-fifties.

Mysteres reached their tar-

get on time and as they pulled up

for attack, all hell turned loose,

with heavy anti-aircraft fire

opening up. Each pilot now con-

centrated to deliver his weapon

accurately on the intended tar-

get. Lady luck seemed to favour

hem and they came out of the

attack, almost unscathed. As

every member ducked to ultra

low levels at full speed in the

homebound course. Devayya

joined in after his attack as the

Hussain, the lone PAF pilot flying

a Starfighter, was vectored by the

radar to intercept the Mysteres as

they were getting away. He posi-

tioned behind the last Mystere for

a missile attack which happened

to be Devayya. What happened

subsequently can only be pieced

load at the end of a dispersal of

ast aircraft in the trail.

its way towards the bombers, as the Starfighter launched its missile.

appear in the darkness and made cance of the raid was a symbolic gesture, less material damage, Even John Fricker, the PAF commissioned hagiographer, was moved to an effusive turn of phrase in describing the raid as 'the most effective Canberra attack of the war.' The real heroes of the raid were, undoubtedly, the Navigators, whose chances of survival, without an ejection seat for them in Canberras, were very close to nothing. It is, therefore, rightly so that Navigators Sqn Ldr SN Bansal and Flt Lt P Dastidar were awarded Vir Chakras for their acts of exceptional gallantry and Commanding Officer Wg Cdr PP Sing was decorated with a Maha Vir Chakra, country's second highest gallantry award. Other members of the raid were Sqn Ldr JC Verma (Leader),

and S Kapoor. My painting 'Tuskers raid Peshawar' was inspired by the account that I read in the book The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965 by Jagan/Samir duo. So, it was initially composed entirely on impressions created in my mind of the attack, as it was narrated in the book. I was very fortunate to have received more inputs from Capt Vivian Goodwin, who was one of the members of this fateful raid of 1965 war. I am also glad that Canberra gang of veterans has appreciated my painting. I am told that they are an extremely closeknit lot and thick as thieves. It was wonderful to interact with few of them through e-mails and very sincerely hope that the painting evokes some memory for those remaining 'few good men' of 5 Squadron and

Mystere Vs Starfighter : Sargodha: Indo- Pak war, 1965

n this painting, I tried to recreate unmatched gallantry of a young Indian pilot, who, unfortunately, did not return from a raid over Sargodha, Pakistan, on 7th September, 1965.

Squadron Leader Devayya was part of a large formation of Mysteres of No. 1 Squadron, attacking Sargodha at the crack of dawn. Owing to the extreme range of the target, only a single pass attack was possible. It was suicidal to even undertake such a mission as minor navigational error could result in entire formation running out of fuel in the enemy territory. Also, for most pilots, it was their first mission deep inside enemy territory.

Defending the PAF airbase were few US made F-86 Sabres and F-104 Starfighters, both aircraft far superior to subsonic Mysteres, that IAF had acquired from

together by some contradictory accounts available from Pakistani source. None of the members of Devayya's formation was aware of this attack developing on their

From the accounts published in books and articles in Pakistan, IAF could reconstruct what now act of heroism' by an airman, who decided to stand up and fight when this should have been the last option to exercise for a pilot. who had barely enough fuel to land back home and was hundreds of miles inside the enemy It is now believed, beyond

doubt, that Devayya after being shot at and his aircraft damaged by the lethal cannon fired from the Starfighter, turned around to challenge his adversary in a 'fight to finish' like a true gladiator. In

the classic air battle that followed

between the vintage Mystere and

the state of the art, supersonic

Starfighter, Devayya managed to

turn the tables in his favour and

hunter became the hunted.

Devayya's bullets tore into the

Starfighter, causing a control fail-

ure, forcing Amjad Hussain to

eject from his aircraft. Amjad

barely survived the ejection at low

level. He was awarded the 'Sitara-

i-Jur'at.' Star of Courage, the

third highest military award in

Pakistan, soon after the war.

Devayya was put on the list of

'Missing believed Killed' after the

war. What led to his actual death

still remains a mystery. It was

revealed much later by Pakistan

that Devayya's body was found

almost intact by villagers, not

very far from Sargodha and

buried. It is quite possible that

Devayya's Mystere finally went

Unfortunately, ejection seat, fitted in a Mystere, was not designed for safe operation at low levels

Devayya's act of gallantry would have gone unknown and unrecognised by his countrymen, had it not been for the Pakistani account that acknowledged the extreme courage of this young Indian pilot. Some 23 years later, Devayya was decorated by Indian Government with a Maha Vir Chakra posthumously, country's second highest gallantry award

Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail retired officer of PAF in his hook. Great Air Battles of Pakistan Air Force, had summarised the encounter between Devayya and Amjad Hussain as

"For many decades, the famous dogfight has confounded

historians and air enthusiasts

alike. The respective Air Forces

cited both pilots for courage as

well as their shooting skills. Flt Lt

Amiad Hussain was awarded the

Sitara-i-Jur'at soon afte the war.

Sqn Ldr Ajjamada Bopayya

awarded the Maha Vir Chakra in

April 1988, after a passage of 23

years. It can be said that medals

are testimony to the dogged deter-

mination of two air knights, who

gave their best in this truly classic

air operations in Indo-Pak war of

1965, also mentions that shooting

down in air combat of a Lockheed


Starfighter of the PAF by an obso-

lescent Dassault Mystere IVA is

among the most creditable and

least published achievements by

IAF during the 1965 war.



The Attack on Tiger Hill

AVM R Nambiar VM & Ba viable as the target would be shad

Air Force dropped its first LGB in anger. The release was from a Mirage 2000, and I was privileged to have been the pilot in-command. In the days that followed, I was honoured to drop four more LGBs, thus dropping 5 out of the total of 8 LGBs delivered by the Mirage 2000 in the Kargil Conflict. This is my story.

Adampur is a major Air Force Base in Punjab and I had been deployed there since 22 May, 1999 for Operation Safed Sagar, which was ndian Air Force monikers for its Air Operations in Kargil, I was then a Wing Commander and posted as the Station Flight Safety and Inspection Officer of Air Force Station, Gwalior, where the Mirage 2000 is based. On the evening of 22 June, we were tasked to attack Tiger Hill with LGBs the next morning. I was selected to captain a two-seater with Sqn Ldr Monish Yadav as my backseater. The target was a set of enemy tents perched at the top. Tiger Hill is unique in shape and

size when viewed from the ground. But from 30,000 ft up, it is indistinguishable from the other tall peaks in the vicinity. The only mountain that stands out in this grand vista is K2. Mount Godwin-Austen, which at 28, 2510 ft towers over its surroundings. The aids on board the Mirage allowed us to spot Tiger Hill with relative ease. We had it in contact by 50 kms and were unpleasantly sur prised to find a tiny cloud perched right on its tip, obscuring the DMPI and rendering the LGB impotent. The endurance of the Mirage allowed us to hold on station for about 30 mins, so that we went around three more times, hoping that the cloud would drift away and we could complete our mission. In the fourth attempt, as we turned away from the target, Monish yelled at me to 'flare left,' indicating a missile launch. I instantly throttled back to idle power and hauled the aircraft upwards in a steep left turn and commenced dropping flares. I did not spot the tiny shoulder launched mis-

towards us and thereafter fall away. as we were outside its envelope. We had no choice but to go back with our armament load and prepare for a reshoot the next day. Morning briefing on the 24th

the South face of Tiger Hill. The

white tents made good camouflage

sense in winter, but in summer, with

most of the snow melted away, they

stood out in stark contrast against

the black rock formation. Tiger Hill

is at an altitude of 16,600 ft, and the

pre-briefed altitude for the attack

was 28,000 ft, to which we quickly

descended. A glance at the INU indi-

cated that the winds at this altitude

was 70 kts in a westerly direction

and at 90 deg to our planned track.

This was excessive, and outside,

there was lease envelope for the

LGB. Going up was not an option as

the Laser was known to switch off

automatically at around 30,000 ft. A

different direction was also not

designate the target for the first was at 0500 hours, and by 0530 hours, time. The Litening Pod instantly a short brief was carried out with ranged the distance to target. We the CAS in attendance. The plan was had, by then, accelerated to a for a three aircraft mission, with two groundspeed of 1000 kmph, and the lead aircraft armed with an LGB distance to the release point rapidly each, while the third aircraft would reduced. I repeatedly re-designated follow behind with the CAS in the the target as it became more dis backseat. The plan was to hit Tiger cernible when we closed in. At the Hill first and then proceed to recce release range, I pressed the trigger Point 4388, located 30 kms NW of and we felt the aircraft ierk upwards Tiger Hill. By 0600 hours, we had as it suddenly shed 600 kgs of load. I walked to the aircraft. Walking to immediately commenced a hard the aircraft is a tedious task in war turn to the left at 4g and stated flar time. We were overloaded with our ing. Monish took over pod, steering, G-suits, helmets and had to lug our and pointed the laser directly at the Makarov 9 mm pistols, along with target, while I concentrated on the the various essential items necesturn and monitored the video image sarv for a successful sortie, such as The Laser was steadily flashing, and maps, call-sign cards, MIPs, EW we waited anxiously for the target to MIPs, INU plans, authentication explode, thus, signalling a successful tables, all in all, a very cumbersome delivery. The time of flight of an procedure. Tiger Hill was spotted LGB under the delivery conditions that we had dropped it in, was under from about 50 kms distance in the Litening Pod, and we were thrilled to 30 sec, but to us in the cockpit, it see that there was not a speck of appeared as an eternity. Our joy cloud around. Things then moved knew no bound as the entire video forward at a rapid pace. I had altered image of the target burst out into a heading to a place that the aircraft soundless explosion. tracked directly at a set of seven Artic tents, perched precariously on

On return, 15 mins later, we routed back via Tiger Hill to film the Hill from close to assess the damage. The target had been blown to smithereens, so, we filmed the rest of the hill for any other visible signs of the enemy. We accelerated our speed

owed. A quick decision was, there-

fore, taken to descend down to

26,000ft, placing us well within the

At 28 kms, I pulsed the laser to

envelope of shoulder fired SAMs.

to get back to Base by 0800 hours. After landing, we extricated the video tape from the Litening Pod. and headed to the crew room for the debrief. The entire squadron was gathered around the TV as the tape was rewound and played back Clearly visible on the tape were four enemy soldiers, rushing across the screen, a few seconds before the bomb got to them. The video on the way back also revealed a person 2.000 ft below the hilltop, climbing painstakingly upwards to the camp.



Tuskers raid Peshawar: Indo-Pak War, 1965

without any escort and without any radar cover, to bomb a very formidable airbase of Pakistan Air

entailed flying to a target at its extreme flying range, through the enemy heartland, with no Attacking Peshawar became

fell at Peshawar on 13 September,

🎵 his is an account of a few 🌎 for Canberras was suicidal, as it 🔝 1965, 08 (Eight) Canberras of 5 Squadron stealthily approached Peshawar. The typical profile of a Canberra raid was to approach to a pre-calculated pull up point between 200 and 500 ft AGL, pull up steeply to about 12,000 feet to drop the load, and then, climb progressively to 40,000 ft to escape from

As Canberras closed in to their target, the ack-ack batteries opened up, signalling that raiders have been detected. PAF pilots and ground crew ran to take shelter in trenches, and they had the rare privilege of seeing the first Canberra drop flares, to illuminate the airfield, and then thunder down the main runway at 200 feet, before pulling up at its end in an wingover to turn back and drop its bomb

the Tuskers, they would have wiped out the entire strategic strike component of the PAF with a single blow, as the entire force of sixteen B-57s were lined up wing tip to wing tip on a dispersal. Unfortunately, for IAF, the single 4000 lb bomb, that fell closest to the parked B-57s, hit soft soil and its explosive force was dissipated. However, bombs dropped from other members of Tusker force found their marks, as fuel dumps were set ablaze, ATC building was flattened and aircraft on ground were damaged. As Canberras set course for home, the inevitable happened. A lone Starfighter was vectored for an intercept on to the retreating bomber force. Canberras did all that was possible to do to prevent a massacre. Sqn Ldr

However, luck favoured the brave and the missile exploded harmlessly, possibly due to its proximity fuze malfunctioning. All eight Canberras landed safely at Agra. The raid shook the PAF out of its complacency. No airfield or town was out of range of Indian bombers. No one in Pakistan had thought that the IAF would bomb Peshawar with impunity. The raid also forced the Americans (USAF). that had maintained a full-fledged Signal Intelligence base, about 20 miles South of Peshawar, to evacuate all its personnel with families through Iran, and return only after cessation of hostilities.

Tuskers raid of Peshawar will certainly go down as one of most audacious bomber attacks in histo-Gautam saw a streak of flame ry of military aviation. The signifi-

YOU.


Flt Lt Deshpande, Wg Cdr PP JBCU of September 1965. Singh, Sqn Ldr CR Mehta, Sqn Ldr VC Godwin, Navigators, Ahluwalia

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THE WALL



BABY BLUES





By Rick Kirkman & Jerry Scott ZITS





